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NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY: FOUNDATIONS OF
INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
SERGIO PUIG*
“obligations that exist, but cannot be enforced, are ghosts . . .
elusive to the grasp.”
―Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

ABSTRACT
This Article explores a fundamental aspect of modern international
investment law: its remedy to enforce a breach. I argue that investorstate arbitration is subject to different conceptualizations that may
animate the way in which adjudicators understand what type of right is
conferred to investors when granted the invocation of responsibility
against a host state. I explore the consequences of the three distinct
conceptualizations (i.e., direct right, beneficiary right, or agency) by
reference to the current debate regarding to whom countermeasures are
opposable under international law. I show how the three dimensions
imply that the construction of substantive law entails important
assumptions about the procedures that will apply when that substantive
law is ultimately enforced. In this sense, the Article evidences some of the
methodological limitations of the ‘procedural-substantive’ distinction
often encountered in international law analysis.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall observed that a government
cannot be called a “government of laws, and not of men . . . if the
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”1
Justice Marshall’s celebrated quote is more than a modest reminder
that in any given legal system there is no right without a remedy. It
is a restatement that when governments themselves violate legal
rights, it is especially important to furnish a remedy.
To be sure, legal scholars agree that providing remedies to the
victims of violations of rights after the fact—whether this law is
domestic or international—is an imperfect solution at best.
However, the disagreement seems to emerge generally once
lawyers and legal scholars attempt to define what is the chief goal
of a particular legal remedy. For instance, a remedy plausibly
provides reparation in certain instances or the opportunity to
ventilate grievances in other situations. Ideally, backward-looking
remedies can deter future violations. In theory, if government
officials or agencies know that they will be held to account, they
will be less likely to commit violations in the first place. More
1

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
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broadly, remedies perform an important expressive function: they
drive home the idea that the law takes violations seriously.
As investor-state arbitration becomes the dominant remedy to
enforce international investment obligations, it is important to ask
the following questions: What is the primary purpose of investorstate arbitration?
And, how the different functional
conceptualizations of investor-state arbitration would—in
practice—interact with the rights conferred under international
law? The two fundamental questions may be at the crux of one of
the main debates of the field, as can be discerned from recent cases
before the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID).
In this essay, I analyze an external face and fundamental part of
international investment law: its remedy to enforce a breach. I
argue that the remedy is subject to different conceptualizations that
may affect the way in which adjudicators understand what type of
right (i.e., direct rights, beneficiary rights, or agency) is conferred to
investors when granted the direct invocation of responsibility
against a host state. I do so by reference to the debate around the
operation of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness for the
breach of an investment treaty by characterizing a conduct as a
countermeasure in response to an anterior breach by a home state.
Or—in more simple terms—the debate regarding to whom
international countermeasure are opposable. Using this debate, I
show that the different justifications relied upon to promote
investor-state arbitration as the main remedy of bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) allow at least three different
understandings of that question and, by implication, different
relational
dimensions
of
remedy.
These
different
conceptualizations emphasize investor-state arbitration as enabling
(primarily) one of the following functions of legal remedies: (a)
procedural justice; (b) corrective justice; or (c) deterrence.
Before proceeding, a cautionary note is in order: the analysis in
this essay provides an opportunity to examine whether and how
the invocation of responsibility by a non-state actor against a host
state can be conceptualized in different ways and some of the
consequences thereof. Whether the interpretation of the rights
should be necessarily determined by such conceptualization, as a
starting point, is a different question. This is ultimately a matter of
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treaty interpretation.2 However, for the purpose of this Article,
and in no way dismissing the issues noted above, a lack of
interpretative guidance in the relevant treaty will be taken for
granted. Not only is the interpretative guidance of BITs on this
issue generally unclear, but it is in these situations that
adjudicators may reveal their assumptions of a remedy. As I hope
to illustrate, this is not to say that the different conceptual
foundations do not affect—consciously or unconsciously—the
interpretative function performed by arbitrators.
The Article begins with a brief discussion of the intellectual
justifications and legal ideas behind investor-state arbitration. It
continues with a main analysis that unpacks three different
justifications for allowing the invocation of responsibility to a nonstate actor directly against a state before an arbitral forum. The
Article concludes by surveying the debate around the
circumstances precluding wrongfulness showing how, at the crux
of it, there is a fundamental disagreement on the main goal of
investor-state arbitration and explaining how this insight can be
applied to other, similar debates. By engaging with such debates
from this perspective—more broadly—I seek to illustrate why the
procedural dimension of international investment law (remedy)
cannot be completely detached from its substantive connotations
(rights).
2.

ORIGINS: A PROCEDURAL FUNCTIONALIST ENTERPRISE

The end of World War II, the dissolution of empires, and the
decolonization process brought a stronger need for a legal system
of protection of foreign direct investment (FDI). This need arose at
a time when a dialogue between two distinct legal conceptions was
heavily influencing international law.3 On the one hand, legal
positivism—whose adherents included primarily European civil
law scholars—argued for the separation of law and morality and

2 See Martins Paparinskis, Investment Treaty Arbitration and the (New) Law of
State Responsibility, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 617, 626 (2013) (arguing that the choice
between direct rights and agency approaches is a matter of treaty interpretation).
3 See Bruce L. Benson, The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law, 55 S.
ECON. J. 644, 645–47 (1989) (distinguishing between legal positivists from natural
law theorists in the context of understanding the development of commercial
law). For a more complete discussion on the background of ICSID, please refer to
Sergio Puig, Recasting ICSID’S Legitimacy Debate: Towards A Goal-Based Empirical
Agenda, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 465 (2013).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/4

04_PUIG (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY

6/4/2014 2:18 AM

833

considered the law as being posited by lawmakers.4 On the other
hand, natural law theory as presented in a more secular form
adopted a different view. Natural law theorists, developed largely
out of the common law tradition (which historically resisted the
separation of morality and law), championed legal processes and
institutional order as essential components of a market-based
society.5 Under both traditions, the law serves an important
coordinative function by providing a framework against which
individuals and organizations might orient actions as well as
rationally evaluate interactions with others and plan ahead.6
These two conceptions of law (legal positivism and secularized
naturalism) dominated Western legal jurisprudence in the 1960’s.
Inspired by H. L. A. Hart and the legal philosophy of Lon L. Fuller,
and profoundly located within classical liberalism’s traditional
emphasis of liberty and freedom, these conceptions may have
influenced the creation of some important international law
initiatives of that time.7 Among other influences, legal forms
experienced a process of assimilation of instrumentalism and
formalism. In its final analysis it meant that international legal
orders were not only the way to subject human conduct to the
governance of legitimate rules, but also to limit evil regimes from
implementing substantially unjust laws that curtail liberties,
4 See generally H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593, 599 (1958) (defending legal positivism from critics); Stanley L.
Paulson, Four Phases in Hans Kelsen’s Legal Theory? Reflections on a Periodization, 18
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 153 (1998) (identifying key claims and evolution of legal
positivism).
5 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 145 (rev. ed. 1969) (“[L]aw [is] . . .
a purposeful enterprise, dependent for its success on the energy, insight,
intelligence, and conscientiousness of those who conduct it, and fated, because of
this dependence, to fall always somewhat short of a full attainment of its goals.”);
Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 379 (1946)
(suggesting that natural law refers to the belief that there are external criteria
“found in the conditions required for successful group living” against which a
judge can evaluate his decision).
6 In secularized individualistic societies, certainty, objectivity and neutrality
tend to be important constitutive values. See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the
Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 48 (2008) (“Law in the first sense requires the
existence of certain general norms that serve as a basis of orientation for people’s
behavior, as well as a basis for decision by the courts.”).
7 See David Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance,
27 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 19–20 (2005) (“Experts argue for their preferred policy or
doctrinal choice by reference to broader theories, methods and political commitments
which they associate with the doctrine or policy they prefer. For lawyers, these
can be theories of law—positivism, naturalism, sociology . . . .”).
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including economic ones. Individual rights represented a form of
empowerment to liberate the individual from the state’s
subjugation, as well as to enable direct enforcement of such
substantive ends of the law.8 For the development of the
international law applicable to investors abroad, the result of this
process of assimilation was the revival of a procedural functionalist
enterprise with, among others, the following features:
(1) a predominant concern for individual rights and
protection of property;
(2) rules enforced by the victims backed by treaties or
reciprocal agreements;
(3) standard adjudicative procedures established to avoid
the escalation of violence;
(4) offenses treated as torts punishable by economic
reparation;
(5) strong incentives for the culprit to yield to the
prescribed decision due to threat of international ostracism;
and
(6) legal change via an evolutionary process of developing
interpretations, customs and norms.9
3.

FUNCTION OF REMEDY: THREE DIFFERENT GOALS

Investor-state arbitration is the poster-child of international
legalization, a phenomenon salient in modern international
economic relations.10 The International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (“ICSID” or the “Centre”), one of the five
organizations of the World Bank (“WB”), can be credited with the
8 This rhetoric not only makes it hard to assess questions of distribution
among favored and less favored rights holders. See MAX WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY 188 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans.,
1967) (“The development of legally regulated relationships . . . is usually regarded
as signifying a decrease of constraint and an increase of individual freedom.”).
9 For a similar argument, see BRUCE L. BENSON, THE ENTERPRISE OF LAW:
JUSTICE WITHOUT THE STATE 21 (1990).
10 For an analysis of the different perspectives on legalization and the
theoretical puzzles that legalization poses for international institutions, see Judith
Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385, 386
(2000) (“These actions, taken in the course of a single year, were representative of
a longer term trend: some international institutions are becoming increasingly
legalized.”).
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rapid expansion and popularity of investor-state arbitration as
primary remedy to address conflicts over investments abroad.11
The signing of the ICSID Convention and the creation of the
Centre not only gave origin to an international organization
specializing in international investment disputes settlement (i.e.,
ICSID), but it also facilitated the expansion and popularization of a
system of protections for foreign investors based on a remedy for
damages directly enforceable by individuals or corporations
against states (i.e., private right of action). More importantly, the
Convention and the Centre served to promote a particular
understanding of the role of foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in
national economic development, to stabilize a vision of economic
cooperation, and to advance—especially, after the Soviet
collapse—an idea of an international “rule of law” via BITs.12
Without being exhaustive, what follows is a brief recounting of
some legalization efforts prior to the signing of the ICSID
Convention. These efforts contextualize the three justificatory
functions of investor-state arbitration as remedy of choice for the
enforcement of international investment agreements.
3.1. Background
Prior to the 1960’s, international investment dispute settlement
looked different and was heavily dependent on traditionally
mercantilist relationships.13 In other words, in contrast with the
current “hybrid,” decentralized, and increasingly privatized
system, international adjudication was built around inter-state
relations.14

11 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. The five organizations of the World
Bank (“WB”) group are: International Finance Corporation (“IFC”), Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”), International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (“IBRD”), International Development Association (“IDA”), and
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).
12 See generally Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law”
Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253, 253–83 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
13 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment
Agreements, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 173–75 (2005) (noting that one
innovation of ICSID Convention was the possibility of investor-state arbitration).
14 See generally Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 184–289 (2003) (discussing the choice of law
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Conflicts over the treatment of property of nationals abroad
have existed—at least—since the growing strength of a bourgeois
merchant class in England and the Netherlands succeeded in the
chartering of trade companies for overseas expansion. This victory
gave rise to a mercantilist expansion in the early 17th century.15
Conflicts then were resolved by some of the methods relied upon
today (e.g., negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and
adjudication) as well as some other methods that are no longer
permissible under international law (e.g., armed interventions for
the collection of debts or privateers authorized by a government by
letters of marquee).16
Foreign investments were put to international adjudication—at
least—as early as the end of the eighteenth century, when mixed
arbitral commissions under Jay’s Treaty of 1794 addressed the
settlement of debts to British creditors.17 Since then, Mixed Claims
Commissions and ad hoc Tribunals (e.g., France–Venezuela, Iran–
United States, United States–Germany, Mexico–United States, or
Iran–United States) developed as an alternative to a centralized
international judicial system. These commissions expanded until
the Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties (“FCNs”)
started providing for state-to-state dispute resolution by the
International Court of Justice after the World-War II.18 Provisions

problems related to jurisdictional conflicts between tribunals established by
treaties, and those constituted pursuant contract).
15 See Anoush Khoshkish, International Law of Investment: An Overview,
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECON. (2012), http://www.globalpoliticaleconomy.com/
art_intlaw.html (“[T]he British East India Company, 1600; the Dutch East India
Company, 1602; the United East India Company (Dutch), 1602; the Dutch West
India Company, 1621; and a number of others which had varying degrees of
success depending on the territories they were targeting.”).
16 Convention Respecting the Limitation of the Employment of Force for the
Recovery of Contract Debts art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, 1 Bevans 607. This
was the first effort to limit the collection of debt by forcible means. While the
early twentieth century prohibition on the use of force to collect debts in the
Hague Conventions was partial, it represented an important step towards the
prohibition, not without caveats, of the use of force under international law. See
U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations.”).
17 Barton Legum, Federalism, NAFTA Chapter Eleven and the Jay Treaty of 1794,
95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 202, 203–05 (2001).
18 William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed
Countries: Reflections on the Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J.
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in modern BITs concerning dispute settlement as well as national
treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, the minimum standard
of treatment, and expropriation each have antecedents in FCNs
and nineteenth-century commercial treaties.
International claims commissions and ad hoc tribunals dealing
with the property of foreigners are a type of ‘second cousins’ of
investor-state arbitration. These commissions were characterized
by an essential state-to-state mode of adjudication;19 the
establishment of semi-permanent decision-making bodies with
certain levels of ‘independency’ of their members;20 and consensual
third-party adjudication, which many times involved contentious
(and sometimes dramatic) events. Suffice it to say that the latter
feature required intense diplomatic efforts or—quite frequently—
what was termed as “‘gunboat diplomacy,’” a now prohibited
manifestation of self-help in international affairs.21
Domestic systems also played (and still play) a fundamental
role in disputes over foreign investment, in large part because at
the core of such disputes tends to be the relationship of property.
National authorities have original jurisdiction over this
relationship. They may decide any conflicts originating as a
consequence of the state’s involvement in the recognition,
regulation, affectation, extinction, etc., unless the state consents to
an international form of dispute settlement. Internationalization
was—in part—also a response to demands to complement some of
TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 5–8 (2006) (explaining the traditional diplomatic protections
available to foreign investors harmed by breaches of international law).
19 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the
United States, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 265 (1988) (describing the 1983 draft’s
state-to-state dispute provisions); see also ROBERT RENBERT WILSON, UNITED STATES
COMMERCIAL TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 104, 104–12 (1960) (discussing
property protections in pre-1923 commercial treaties).
20 According to Professors Eric Posner and John Yoo, judges are
“independent” when they are appointed in advance of any particular dispute and
serve fixed terms. Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in
International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005).
21 Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 830, 880 (2006) (“[U]nder traditional state-based principles of international
law—i.e., those from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries—the safeconduct promise was enforceable through the offended sovereign’s right to make
war in the event of a breach.”). See SIR JAMES CABLE, GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY 1919–
1979: POLITICAL APPLICATIONS OF LIMITED NAVAL FORCE 39 (1981) (“Gunboat
diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of
war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in the furtherance of an
international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the
jurisdiction of their own state.”).
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the perceived deficiencies of domestic courts and in some cases the
inexistence of competent justice systems.22 Especially in the eyes of
capital exporter countries, national courts—particularly in the
recently de-colonialized world—raised concerns as to capacity for
speedy, neutral, and technical resolution of claims.23 That was a
convenient framing too since, perhaps, they were worried of
rollbacks of concessions and nationalizations.
Thus, in theory, prior to the expansion of investor-state
arbitration, the cases involving property of aliens abroad were
initially treated as domestic conflicts, unless the parties had agreed
on compulsory arbitration.
Only after spending economic,
diplomatic, or military resources could international adjudication
follow in a mercantilist (state-to-state) mode. Only states could
bring claims following the formal rules derived from general
international law, commonly known as exhaustion of local
remedies, espousal of claims, and diplomatic protection.24 Dr.
Aron Broches, often referred to as the founding father of ICSID,
explains the fundamental change brought by the Convention in the
following way:

22 Adjudication was rarely the result of pre-established dispute settlement
arrangements, and very often the result of international agreements or
compromises entered into by states after the alleged illicit conduct. More than
once, those agreements to adjudicate disputes that affected the economic interests
of nationals abroad were the product of forcefully negotiated concessions or
settlement or peace agreements. See Luis M. Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to
International Policy, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 692, 692 (1907) (describing the “steps taken by
England, Germany and Italy in . . . 1902, against Venezuela for the settlement of
claims of various sorts”). But see generally MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES (2007)
(arguing that the use of force to collect Venezuelan debt was exceptional and not
motivated solely by default).
23 CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 6 (2001)
(“Rightly or wrongly, the national courts of one of the disputing parties are not
perceived as sufficiently impartial.”).
24 Some argue that the exhaustion of local remedies is also a substantive
obligation. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Waiver and the Exhaustion of Local Remedies
Rule in NAFTA Jurisprudence, in NAFTA INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: PAST
ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS 253, 259 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004)
(“The proceduralists have won the debate. It is clear that acts outside denials of
justice can form the basis for international claims and that state parties can waive
the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. Moreover, in the investment
treaty context that fact is explicit—most treaties set forth a list of potential
violations, such as a failure to provide national treatment or an expropriation not
in accordance with international law.”)
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From the legal point of view, the most striking feature of
the [ICSID] Convention is that it firmly establishes the
capacity of a private individual or a corporation to proceed
directly against a State in an international forum, thus
contributing to the growing recognition of the individual as
a subject of international law.25
In fact, the private right of action for damages enabled (and
pioneered) by ICSID navigates the contours of private and public
law, contractual and general rights and obligations, individual and
State participation, and national and international law. It does so
by borrowing elements from different legal structures,26 including
public and private international law,27 international arbitration and
ADR,28 and international relations and diplomacy.29 Some of these
25 Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, in SELECTED ESSAYS: WORLD BANK,
ICSID, AND OTHER SUBJECTS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 188, 198
(1995) [hereinafter Broches, ESSAYS] (footnote omitted). The word striking, of
course, was an exaggeration. Individuals had access to international tribunals
prior to ICSID (e.g. Central American Court of Justice). See Manley O. Hudson,
The Central American Court of Justice, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 759, 769–770, 772–773 (1932)
(describing individual access to the Central American Court of Justice).
26 The ICSID Convention came into force in October 1966. The rules and
regulations were modeled on different sources. See Antonio R. Parra, The
Development of the Regulations and Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes, 22 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 55, 55–57 (2007)
(describing the creation of ICSID, and its rules and regulations and noting that the
rules “also drew inspiration from, among other sources, the Statute and Rules of
the World Court, the International Law Commission’s 1958 Model Rules on
Arbitral Procedure and the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 1962 Rules for
Arbitration and Conciliation for Settlement of International Disputes Between
Two Parties of Which Only One is a State”).
27 The system borrows important legal infrastructure from international law.
Irrespective of whether or not an international investment agreement (“IIA”),
contract, or investment law refers to international law as the law applicable to the
merits of the dispute, international law will be the law governing the dispute to
the extent that what is at stake is the international responsibility of a state. The
tools available under public international law for the interpretation and the
application of a treaty also determine formal elements of jurisdiction, competence,
attribution, and reparation. See Yas Banifatemi, The Law Applicable in Investment
Treaty Arbitration, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS:
A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 191 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed., 2010) (explaining the
choice of law process in international arbitration).
28 Investor-state arbitration borrows from international arbitration and ADR
the idea of technical specialization to deal with matters wherein the technical
complexity surpasses the knowledge of generalist or parochial judges. It also
borrows the idea of procedural fairness and territorial ‘neutrality’ reflected in
institutions such as the party appointed arbitrator/conciliator and, in the case of
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fundamental characteristics were outlined at the outset of the
negotiations of the ICSID Convention as follows:
a recognition by [s]tates of the possibility of direct access by
private individuals and corporations to an international
tribunal in the field of financial and economic disputes with
Governments;
a recognition by [s]tates that agreements made by them
with private individuals and corporations to submit such
disputes to arbitration are binding international
undertakings;
the provision of international machinery for the conduct of
arbitration, including the availability of arbitrators,
methods for their selection and rules for the conduct of the
arbitral proceeding;
provision for conciliation as an alternative to arbitration.30
This brief background is useful to launch the three most
common justifications used to defend investor-state arbitration.
When dissected, the three sources support different
the ICSID system, delocalized arbitration to ensure the recognition, enforcement,
and execution of the arbitration even against the losing party’s will. See Parra,
supra note 26, at 60 (describing how Rule 6(2) was changed because arbitrators
were increasingly required to disclose any past interaction or relationship with
parties); W. Michael Reisman, International Investment Arbitration and ADR:
Married but Best Living Apart, 24 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 185, 185-92
(2009) (arguing that ADR and international arbitration are both “adversarial” to
each other and supplement each other, and often are pushed to come to
settlements by the threat of compulsory arbitration).
29 Reputation and the preference for negotiated outcomes are important
elements of international relations practice. Under the eyes of the planner, in an
internationally interdependent world, a trustworthy reputation is necessary to
attract FDI.
Reputation and cooperation are important for assessing
trustworthiness of international actors and increase the likelihood that they will
abide by the terms of negotiated agreements. These features are evident in clear
mandates for registration to assess formal elements of jurisdiction and ripeness of
claims. See Aron Broches, Theory and Practice of Treaty Registration with Particular
Reference to Agreements of the International Bank (1957), in Broches, ESSAYS, supra
note 25, at 99, 129–58 (examining the attitude of the ICJ and its failure to address
treaty non-registration by reviewing five cases where the issue of registration
should have been raised but was ignored).
30 A. BROCHES, GEN. COUNS., NOTE TRANSMITTED TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS:
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE PARTIES (1961),
reprinted in INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISP., 2 THE HISTORY OF THE
SID CONVENTION: PART 1 at 1, 2 (1968) [hereinafter BROCHES NOTE].
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understandings of what the primary function of the remedy is,
emphasize a different theory of compensation promoted by the
remedy, and sustain different views of the relationship between
the remedy enabled and the nature of rights conferred under the
international investment instruments.
3.2. Procedural Justice: Guarantee of Bargaining Power
The particular dynamics found in asymmetric conflicts over
property relationships involving states and foreign investors have
served as the main justification for investor-state arbitration.
Under this view, the remedy represents a response to calls for
access to effective justice in the form of readily available,
competent, neutral, and procedurally informal (compared to the
formalities imposed by public international law) processes for
resolving disputes involving investments abroad.31 Ideologically,
it reflects the response to a particular way of problematizing a type
of economic conflicts and the variability (and specificity) of factors
involved.32
In response to these demands, investor-state
arbitration institutionalizes a form—perhaps the preferred
method—of international investment disputes settlement.33
Under this justification, the invocation of responsibility by a
non-state actor against a host state is designed primarily to
respond to concerns over procedural justice. Chiefly, the remedy is
designed to grant direct access to seek a settlement or award that
confirms that a disrupted investment by the hands of the state had
value.34
Arbitration, the dispute settlement technique and
framework of dialogue, is consensual, and attempts to encourage
negotiated outcomes (i.e., amicable settlement between the
31 See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD
29 (1915) (“[I]t is clear that by international law there is no legal duty incumbent
upon the state to extend diplomatic protection. Whether such a duty exists
toward the citizen is a matter of municipal law of his own country, the general
rule being that even under municipal law the state is under no legal duty to
extend diplomatic protection.”).
32 See generally William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation
of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981) (arguing
that disputes in general are social constructs).
33 See, e.g., id.; Jan Paulsson, Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 232, 232 (1995) (“This new world of international arbitration is
one in which the claimant need not have a contractual relationship with the
defendant.”).
34 See generally E. Allan Lind et al., Individual and Corporate Dispute Resolution:
Using Procedural Fairness as a Decision Heuristic, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 224, 225 (1993).
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parties).35 The procedural rules establish a basic methodology that
ensures that a party cannot block the proceedings by refusing to
cooperate in the tribunal constitution36 and ensures a basic formal
equality during the process of adjudication.37
Under this first claim, the threat of ‘neutral’ international
dispute settlement means that even the sturdiest state can become
attractive for investors, including states who had not originally
stipulated international forms of dispute settlement in individual
contracts. This feature, also known as open-ended consent to
arbitration, obviates the need for investors to negotiate the
internationalization of a regime consisting of arbitration and an
international law clause into individual contracts with the host
state.
Professor Michael Reisman presents the concept of investorstate arbitration as primarily a remedy to facilitate negotiated
outcomes and guarantee bargaining power in a fundamentally
asymmetrical context as follows:
A common feature of foreign direct investment is that the
investor has sunk substantial capital in the host [s]tate, and
cannot withdraw it or simply suspend delivery and write
off a small loss as might a trader in a long-term trading
relationship.
The Romans said “potior est conditio
defendentis,” and this is likely to be the situation in foreign
direct investment. So rather than having an equality of
bargaining power in an exclusively negotiation-based
regime, parity will cease and things will tilt heavily in favor
of the respondent [s]tate. Unless, that is, both sides
appreciate that if negotiations fail, compulsory arbitration
will follow.38

35 See generally Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID), Rules of Procedure for Arbitration
Proceedings, r. 21, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/
RulesMain.jsp (governing pre-hearing conference) [hereinafter ICSID Arbitration
Rules].
36 See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, at art. 38 (allowing Chairman to
appoint an arbitrator ninety days after notice at the request of one party, and after
“consulting both parties as far as possible”). See also ICSID Arbitration Rules,
supra note 35, at r. 4 (governing appointment of arbitrators by the chairman of the
administrative council).
37 See, e.g., ICSID Arbitration Rules, supra note 35, at r. 19–28.
38 Reisman, supra note 28, at 190–91.
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3.3. Corrective Justice: Compartmentalization of International
Economic Conflicts
The second justificatory source, corrective justice, adopts the
stereotype followed by some international law experts that power
is a force that works in opposition to law. Prior to the expansion of
investor-state arbitration, international conflicts over the treatment
of foreign property experienced the direct involvement of the
states of nationality of the investor and the investment’s host. In
such context—according to the second foundational idea
underpinning the remedy—the involvement would inescapably
favor powerful states over weaker ones. With the increasing
complexity of international relations, this could give rise to
paralyzing diplomatic confrontations and destructive zero-sum
games between states affected by the conflict.39
Investor-State arbitration, however, attempts to create a
mutually beneficial setting for several of the parties involved. It
does so by compartmentalizing potentially daunting conflicts
between states into individual disputes between investors and
states.
This—some may argue—helps to “de-politicize”
internationally distressing conflicts, liberating a tense space
between states to be employed for building constructive
relationships.40 This approach assumes that law tames the role of
power in world politics, favoring long-term cooperation, stability
and diplomatic solidarity.
As the goal-based argument goes, to compartmentalize
conflicts and relax state-to-state relations, a less formal order (as
compared to the system of adjudication of public international law)
and, to some extent, more transparent process (as compared to the
informal efforts that the WB would provide at request of member
states) was “institutionalized.”41 Thus, by allowing an individual
39 Cf. Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and International Law,
100 AM. J.INT’L L. 64, 65 (2006) (“[L]egal rules and institutions did not arise out of
the power of the coercive state but, rather, out of custom, consensus, and private
ordering.”)
40 See Martins Paparinskis, The Limits of Depoliticisation in Contemporary
Investor-State Arbitration, in 3 SELECT PROCEEDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIETY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 271, 273 (James Crawford & Sarah Nouwen eds., 2012)
(arguing that the concept of de-politicization may be used in four different
fashions but “has no self-evident use for conceptualising and resolving modern
challenges”). In this article, I take the meaning officially advanced by ICSID’s
leadership and not other possible uses of the same concept.
41 BROCHES NOTE, supra note 30, at 6.
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or a corporation to proceed directly against a state in an
international forum, the remedy should help to reduce the
interference of the state of nationality of the investor in the
domestic affairs of the host state. This should also be reassuring
for the host state because it allows it to avoid the acceptance of the
jurisdiction of the courts of another, often more powerful, state.42
With a remedy to directly enforce breaches of international
investment law, the foreign investor improves her position by
having a better ability to assess the risks in investing abroad, and,
if the reasonable operating assumptions are affected by excessive
government intervention, the foreign investor may be able to
succeed and obtain reparation in an independent legal process.43
By obviating the need for diplomatic protection, the investor has
much more control, including the ability to influence the outcome
by bringing arguments that better fit her reality and appointing
neutral arbitrators. The investor is also insulated from the
arbitrariness of the practice of diplomatic protection. In this sense,
under this second functional source, investor-state arbitration
follows a corrective justice rationale because it is more interested in
the “victim’s” perspective, i.e., the entity that allegedly suffered
injustice at the hands of the infracting state.44
For the host state and the state of nationality of the investor the
benefits are also clear: not only can the respondent avoid—in
theory—facing the state of nationality of the investor (often more
powerful given investment trends) in the dispute, but both could
focus on building constructive relationships and avoiding foul
claims over money.45 This individual-state mode of dispute
Id.
See Philip C. Jessup, Responsibility of States for Injuries to Individuals, 46
COLUM. L. REV. 903, 908 (1946) (describing the pre-ICSID limitations on foreign
investor’s power). See also J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 277–78 (6th ed., 1963) (arguing that state-tostate procedure “is far from satisfactory from the individual’s point of view. He
has no remedy of his own, and the state to which he belongs may be unwilling to
take up his case for reasons which have nothing to do with its merits”).
44 See George P. Fletcher, Remembering Gary—And Tort Theory, 50 UCLA L.
REV. 279, 287 (2002) (discussing the history of modern corrective justice theory,
and arguing that “strict liability—liability for harmed caused by risk-taking
without wrongdoing—is a fact of modern tort law”).
45 See Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L. Q. REV. 438,
454 (1947), reprinted in 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 487, 504 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 1975) (arguing that the
espousal of a claim by the state tends to impart the complexion of political
controversy and of unfriendly action); see also ICSID Convention, supra note 11, at
42
43
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settlement will reduce the possibility of abuses by powerful states
by prohibiting the espousal of the claim unless, of course, the
respondent state fails to abide by and comply with the pecuniary
obligations of the awards.46 This goal of de-politicization also
requires building a specific legal and institutional infrastructure.
This infrastructure represented a historical quid pro quo: the private
right of action and the commitment of states to recognize and
enforce pecuniary obligations as if they were the final judgment of
a national court were paralleled by the obligation on the part of the
state of nationality of the investor to exercise restraint and not to
intervene in the dispute.47
In short, this second defense of investor-state arbitration
originates from the attempts to compartmentalize international
economic conflicts and the consequent insulation of inter-state
politics through a formal international legal process.48 Under this
view, the remedy is chiefly a system of protection for foreign
art. 27 (“No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, or bring an
international claim, in respect of a dispute which one if its nationals and another
Contracting State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to
arbitration under this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have
failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such dispute.”).
46 See SCHREUER, supra note 23, at 416 (“[T]he arbitration procedure provided
by ICSID offers considerable advantages to both sides. The foreign investor no
longer depends on the uncertainties of diplomatic protection but obtains direct
access to an international remedy. The dispute settlement process is depoliticized
and subjected to objective legal criteria . . . . In turn, by consenting to ICSID
arbitration the host State obtains the assurance that it will not be exposed to an
international claim by the investor’s home State, as long as it abides by the
award.”)
47 ICSID Convention, supra note 11, at art. 54 (capturing the particular
advantage of ICSID, since its methodology also allows for what is called a
delocalized system of enforcement preventing the intervention of domestic courts
in reviewing ICSID decisions). See also Edward Baldwin, Mark Kantor & Michael
Nolan, Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards, 23 J. INT’L ARB. 1, 1 (2006) (quoting
Mar. Int’l Nominees Establishment (MINE) v. Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/4, Ad Hoc Committee Decision of December 22, 1989, 5 ICSID REV.—
FILJ 95 (1990)) (stating that the ICSID Convention “excludes any attack on the
award in the national courts”).
48 See generally Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Toward a Greater Depoliticization of
Investment Disputes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA, in INVESTING WITH CONFIDENCE:
UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (Kevin W.
Lu, Gero Verheyen & Srilal M. Perera eds., 2009); see also Robert B. Shanks, Lessons
in the Management of Political Risk: Infrastructure Projects (A Legal Perspective), in
MANAGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK 85, 93 (Theodore H. Moran ed., 1998)
(“The politically sensitive nature of infrastructure projects [and] their relative
vulnerability to government interference . . . heightens the importance of . . .
dispute resolution procedure.”).
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investors and de-politicization of investment disputes. This view
of investor-state arbitration was adopted by Ibrahim Shihata. The
former Secretary-General argued that the remedy enabled by the
ICSID Convention “provide[s] developing countries with a
response which, compared to the Calvo Doctrine, is both more
adequate in the depoliticization of disputes and more effective in
the encouragement of foreign investment, without inviting the
abuses of diplomatic protection.”49
3.4. Deterrence: Prevention of Opportunistic Behavior of States
The post-War stabilization efforts resulted in the continued
desire on the part of western policy-makers to involve private
enterprise in economic activity and to encourage private
investment to eventually replace aid programs and state
subsidization. At the same time, these efforts contributed to
understanding risk management and the creation of agencies to
address non-commercial risks like inconvertibility, expropriation,
civil war, revolution, or insurrection.50
These ideas of risk reduction, free market, and economic
efficiency underscore the third functional goal of investor-state
arbitration: prevention of opportunistic behavior of states.
Informed by ‘neoclassical’ economic theory, some economists and
development
specialists
advocated—successfully—for
the
extension of a private right of action for damages as a risk reducing
commitment. Under this theory, private FDI leads to economic
growth and economic development. In order to encourage FDI,
well-defined property rights adopted in different instruments of
protection (i.e., relationship-specific contracts, foreign investment
laws, or investment treaties) shall be complemented by access to a
functional dispute-settlement forum. Without a proper forum,

49 Shihata, supra note 48, at 23. See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The ICSID
Convention: Origins and Transformation, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 47, 54 (2009)
(noting the some countries’ opposition to the ICSID Convention because “it
implied curtailment of the judicial branch’s monopoly of the administration of
justice, and would grant foreign investors a legally privileged position”).
50 See SHAYERAH ILIAS AKHTAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, THE OVERSEAS
PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION: BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 2–3
(2013), available at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-567.pdf (stating that Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) insures investments against currency
inconvertibility, expropriation, and political violence).
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property rights’ enforcement would be unreliable, and unreliability
creates higher risks as well as lower incentives to invest.51
Under this third justificatory source, investor-state arbitration
is first a mechanism for enforcement of international commitments
that would deter opportunistic and rapacious behavior or capture
on the part of governments against foreign investors. The remedy
is therefore considered to be the enforcement side that minimizes
some risks for long-term commitment of resources. The quid pro
quo in this strategy requires states to surrender original jurisdiction
for potential claims to international investment dispute settlement
in the hope of attracting sustained fluxes of FDI that will increase
the possibilities for economic development.
For that, the
theoretical focus of the remedy is deterrence; the process of
economic compensation to affected investors serves mainly as an
ex post remedy in order to assure that ex ante potential wrongdoers
will weigh the costs of injury against the benefits of productive
activity.
Under this third claim, investor-state arbitration enables the
use of private rights of action for damages as a risk-reducing
commitment.
The argument follows that this deters the
opportunistic behavior of states, having in mind—in the long
run—incentivizing foreign investment. This theory is expressed in
the analysis of law and economic scholars like Professor Alan O.
Sykes:
[T]he utility of a private right of action for money damages
is obvious. To see why, consider a world of BITs without
the private action. In the event of an uncompensated
expropriation or similar action, an investor would have to
lobby [her] own government to take some sort of action
against the violator state. The investor might be politically
inefficacious in this process for any number of reasons.
[She] might be unable to offer enough political benefits in
return for the governments’ assistance. [Her] government
might have diplomatic reasons for declining to take any
action or for declining to retaliate against the violator in any
effective way.
And even if some retaliation were
forthcoming, the retaliation might do nothing to
51 See BROCHES NOTE, supra note 30, at 244 (quoting one of the delegates
participating in the ICSID Convention negotiation, “economic development could
not be achieved without capital and . . . developing countries would not obtain
capital unless they provided adequate [legal] guarantees”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

04_PUIG (DO NOT DELETE)

848

6/4/2014 2:18 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:3

compensate the investor for [her] losses. Considerable risk
for investors would remain, and the risk premium on new
investments would reflect it. A credible promise of
monetary compensation to investors, by contrast, in an
amount set by neutral arbitrators, goes much further to
reduce investment risk and to achieve the developing
countries’ goal of lowering the cost of foreign capital.52
In summary, functionally investor-state arbitration can be
conceptualized in three different ways: first, as a method for
investment dispute settlement; second, as a system to achieve
legalization towards an increased ‘de-politicization’ of investment
disputes; and, third, as a mechanism for the removal of
impediments to the free international flow of private investment
that are posed by non-commercial risks. This distinction also
reaffirms the three dimensions of investor-state arbitration and
stresses particular theories of compensation: first, as the preferred
specialized international method for investment dispute settlement
concerned with procedural justice; second, as a (self-contained and
delocalized in the case of ICSID) process to deciding legal disputes
between states and investors allowing for direct corrective justice;
and third, as a multilateral enforcement mechanism concerned
with deterrence of conducts affecting investments abroad. Of
course, these three distinctions are somehow oversimplified, but I
believe they capture the basic intuitions that may animate the
arbitrators’ reasoning. The following section discusses how each of
these different conceptions may animate a different functional
relationship with treaty rights under international law.
4.

NATURE OF RIGHT: FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP

In this section, I use the debate around the operation of a
countermeasure in response to an anterior breach by a home state
in the investor-state context to show how the three approaches
may imply different functional relationships with the rights
conferred under BITs.

52 Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International Economic
Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 643 (2005).
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4.1. Background
The debate arose in the context of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) investment provisions.53 After a longstanding disagreement regarding the specific meaning of the treaty
provisions, the Mexican Congress approved a controversial excise
tax on the use of fructose on soft drinks. Instead of collecting
revenue, the tax indirectly forced soft drink producers to use
Mexican sugar by excessively taxing the sale of soft drinks made
with fructose while exempting those made with cane sugar. The
measure openly discriminated against fructose producers in
Mexico (almost exclusively owned by U.S. investors).
Four U.S. companies started three investor-state arbitration
proceedings on behalf of their controlled and locally-incorporated
subsidiaries. Since Mexico’s efforts to consolidate these claims
failed, the cases were conducted in separate proceedings. The
claimants argued that the tax was, among other things, inconsistent
with Mexico’s national treatment obligation under the investment
protection provisions of NAFTA.
During the investor-State proceedings adjudicating these
claims, Mexico conceded the discriminatory character of the tax
but argued that it was a “legitimate countermeasure” that
precluded wrongfulness adopted in response to what Mexico
characterized as a prior U.S. violation of intra-state obligations
under NAFTA. The three tribunals decided that the tax was
discriminatory, in violation of the national treatment obligation,
and that Mexico’s actions entailed liability. However, the tribunals
faced the question of whether a countermeasure for the alleged
prior violations by the United States could be directly applicable to
investors. While reaching the same practical outcomes, the three
tribunals decided the case differently, sparking a doctrinal debate
regarding the nature of investors’ rights.54
Such controversy has been elegantly dissected by Martins
Paparinskis as follows:

53 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
54 See Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO–
NAFTA ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ is Cooking, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L., 197, 197–200 (2006)
(discussing the complexity of parallel proceedings within different international
frameworks, which can sometimes yield inconsistencies).
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[e]ven though the host state may in principle apply
countermeasures to investment obligations, their effect and
limits depend on the nature of the investors’ rights.
Countermeasures are relative in effect and may not be
adopted otherwise than in response to a prior breach of
international law by the entity to which the obligation is
owed.55
In his brilliant contribution addressing this topic, he explains
that adopting the analytical perspective of investors’ rights either
as right-holders (by reference to human and consular rights
analogies), beneficiaries (by reference to the law of treaties rules on
third states analogies), or agents (by reference to diplomatic
protection analogies), has the following implications:
From the perspective of delegated diplomatic protection,
the host state owes primary obligations only to the home
state, and the investor only invokes responsibility for their
breach; consequently, countermeasures can be successfully
opposed to the only beneficiary of the obligation and can in
principle successfully preclude wrongfulness, provided
that other criteria are satisfied. However, if the investor is
also the beneficiary of the obligation (whether akin to a
third party or as an entity with direct rights), then the
precluding wrongfulness of countermeasures, while
opposable to one beneficiary (the home state), is not
opposable to the other beneficiary (the investor). 56
4.2. Third-Party Rights: Access to Justice and Dispute Settlement
As presented under the procedural justice approach, investorstate arbitration serves fundamentally as a remedy to ensure access
to justice, neutrality, and fairness by empowering individuals and
corporations to directly participate in a dispute settlement
process—arguably an option that may be unavailable to foreigners
before domestic justice systems or elsewhere. Without fully

Paparinskis, supra note 2, at 632 (emphasis added).
Id. Cf. Anthea Roberts, State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid
Theory of Interdependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority, 55 HARV. INT’L
ECON. L. J., 1, 68-70 (2014) (concluding “that investment treaty rights are granted
to investors and home states on an interdependent basis, and interpretive
authority is shared between the treaty parties, investor-state tribunals, and stateto-state tribunals.”)
55
56
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entering into the merits of such debate, it is fair to say that the
defense of investor-state arbitration under this basis can be taken
with a grain of salt. For instance, it is often argued that investorstate arbitration is not fair because decision-makers are not truly
independent.57 According to some authors, “the development of
this new ‘common law of investment’ has been placed primarily in
the hands of an exceedingly small pool of super-elite, like-minded
international lawyers who operate largely divorced from any
municipal political process.”58 Moreover, in part because of design
elements (e.g., cost, capacity, access to expertise, etc.), investor-state
arbitration is not truly accessible to the majority of the business
community.59 Therefore, the investor-state may only serve the
interests of large transnational corporations since in actuality the
remedy is accessible to very few actors, and arguably only
supports already empowered global economic participants.
In any event, the direct invocation of responsibility by a nonstate actor against a host state in an arbitral setting under this
perspective serves a fundamental task: to provide foreigners
investing abroad with a neutral, non-state forum for reparation
that may increase access to justice and by implication equalize
bargaining power between the sovereign and the regulated party.
The majority decision of the tribunal in Corn Products v. Mexico
(Greenwood and Serrano de la Vega) may be paradigmatic of the
impulse to think of investor-state arbitration as a remedy
57 See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., Political Science Research on International
Law: The State of the Field, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 85 (2012) (“Political scientists have
recently analyzed several ways in which delegation of problems and conflicts to
international courts shapes legal evolution. One important finding is that the
extent of such delegation increases with two variables relating to the design of
courts: judicial independence (which depends on the selection method and tenure
of judges) and access. Another important finding—which resonates with work
done by lawyers on the impact of independent tribunals—is that access for
private, non-state litigants and compulsory jurisdiction both contribute to judicial
independence.”) (footnotes omitted). See generally PIA EBERHARDT & CECILIA
OLIVET, CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY & TRANSNAT’L INST., PROFITING FROM INJUSTICE:
HOW LAW FIRMS, ARBITRATORS AND FINANCIERS ARE FUELLING AN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION BOOM (2012), available at http://corporateeurope.org/trade/
2012/11/profiting-injustice.
58 Jason Webb Yackee, Pacta Sunt Servanda and State Promises to Foreign
Investors Before Bilateral Investment Treaties: Myth and Reality, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1550, 1611 (2009).
59 See Karen J. Alter, Private Litigants and the New International Courts, 39
COMP. POL. STUD. 22, 46 (2006) (noting that notwithstanding the increase of
compulsory jurisdiction, international adjudicative bodies still have limited
resources for the majority of the business community).
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fundamentally concerned with access to justice and dispute
settlement. Functionally, the remedy formalizes a procedure that
ensures a certain level of neutrality for addressing conflicts. It
gives the affected investors direct control over the claims, and
ensures that proceedings can continue even without direct
participation of the host state. The following excerpt of Corn
Products compares the investors’ own benefit of international
obligations to the rights of a third party, and hence the remedy is a
procedural endeavor primarily concerned with access to
international justice:
It has long been the case that international lawyers have
treated as a fiction the notion that in diplomatic protection
cases the State was asserting a right of its own—violated
because an injury done to its national was in fact an injury
to the State itself. It was a necessary fiction, because
procedurally only a State could bring an international
claim, but the fact that it did not reflect substantive reality
showed through not only in the juristic writing but also in
various rules of law surrounding diplomatic protection
claims . . . . However, there is no need to continue that
fiction in a case in which the individual is vested with the
right to bring claims of its own. In such a case there is no
question of the investor claiming on behalf of the State. The
State of nationality of the Claimant does not control the
conduct of the case. No compensation which [sic] is
recovered will be paid to the State. The individual may
even advance a claim of which the State disapproves or
base its case upon a proposition of law with which the State
disagrees . . . . [Hence] an investor which brings a claim is
seeking to enforce what it asserts are its own rights under
the treaty and not exercising a power to enforce rights
which are actually those of the State . . . . [T]his is a case
involving the rights of a third party and not merely its
interests. Mexico owed obligations . . . separate from the
obligations it owed to the United States . . . [hence]
countermeasures could operate to preclude the
wrongfulness of the HFCS tax vis-à-vis the United States
[but not vis-à-vis the investor].60
60 Corn Products. Int’l, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/01 (NAFTA), Decision on Responsibility, ¶¶ 170–76 (Jan. 15, 2008),

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/4

04_PUIG (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

NO RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY

6/4/2014 2:18 AM

853

4.3. Direct Rights: De-Politicization and Compensation
The specialization and de-politicization functions of the
remedy are both concerned with its effects on conflict resolution.
However, the de-politicization function is specifically concerned
with the diplomatic relationship between the investor’s state of
nationality of the investor and the host state of the investor. Under
this functional claim of the remedy, formalizing disputes without
the involvement of the investor’s state of nationality results in
equality among states, limiting arbitrariness and “abuses of
diplomatic protection.”61 The assumption is that without investorstate arbitration, foreign investment disputes will be relegated to
the sphere of power politics, and dominant global powers would
reign.62 Hence the arbitration format (investors-state) and relief
(damages only) help to frame political and economic conflicts in
stable ways for the pursuit of larger policy goals.63
Of course, the arbitration process cannot always guarantee
fairness. International realists, as well as critical legal scholars,
have long pointed to the ways in which international law itself is
instrumental to and shaped by power.64 This idea may reinforce
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=showDoc&docId=DC1012_En&caseId=C29.
61 See Shihata, supra note 48, at 2, 23 (noting that in the past century abuse of
diplomatic protection drove many countries to require all disputes be resolved
exclusively in domestic courts, and that arbitration offers a solution because
“[r]esort to ICSID precludes the investor's state from exercising diplomatic
protection or instituting an international claim unless the host state fails to comply
with the award rendered in such dispute”).
62 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 207
(2d ed. 2004) (stating that one feature of the IIAs “is that they are made between
unequal partners,” which demonstrates this dichotomy in the context of ICSID
and IIA since it relates to the relationship between strong, capital-exporter states
that may use power diplomacy to force weaker, capital-importer states to settle in
unequal terms) (citation omitted). See also ICSID DATABASE OF BILATERAL
INVESTMENT TREATIES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet (last
visited Apr. 3, 2014) (follow “Bilateral Investment Treaties” hyperlink) (presenting
an organized database of BITs listed by country).
63 See Christian Reus-Smit, The Politics of International Law, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 36, 36 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004) (“[I]nstitutions are
created by political actors as structuring or ordering devices, as mechanisms for
framing politics in ways that enshrine predominant notions of legitimate agency,
stabilise individual and collective purposes, and facilitate the pursuit of
instrumental goals.”).
64 For a classic discussion on the role of power, see KENNETH N. WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (arguing that international rules are the

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

04_PUIG (DO NOT DELETE)

854

6/4/2014 2:18 AM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 35:3

the stereotype that power is a force that works in opposition to
law.65 At the same time, the remedy may serve as substitutes that
allow domestic power brokers to “exit local jurisdictions with poor
institutions,” or to affect judicial politics around specific normative
issues by extending corrective options to foreign investors.66
The correct interpretative exercise to determine whether direct
invocation of the investor should be viewed as a third party or as
an entity with direct rights requires a complex analysis reaching
into the broader architecture of investment law.67 I leave that
discussion to more able scholars. My point is simply that under a
direct rights approach of the remedy, the emphasis is in the
corrective nature of the remedy. This function opens the possibility
of material compensation without distressing other relationships
between states (or states and its nationals) by reducing the spaces
for arbitrariness and abuses that come with the exercise of
diplomatic protection.
In this sense, one can read the direct right to invoke
responsibility as a mechanism to correct a breach to international
commitments through payment of compensatory damages. It
allows the ‘victim’ or investor who allegedly suffered the wrong at
the hands of the authorities, to obtain a finding that a breach has
occurred and, if it is the case, possibly receive a direct payment of
damages for the violation by the host state without any
involvement of the home state. This picture of investor-state
arbitration, as primarily a corrective mechanism for foreign
pronouncements of powerful states and are subject to change along with
fluctuations in state power). See also John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of
International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5, 7 (1995) (arguing that international
institutions cannot have independent effects on state behavior).
65 See Steinberg & Zasloff, supra note 39, at 74 (“[S]tate behavior and
associated international outcomes may appear to be shaped by international law,
but because international law mirrors the interests of powerful states,
international law is merely an epiphenomenon of underlying power.”).
66 See Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral
Investment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 108, 122–23 (2005)
(arguing that “institutions that lie at the intersection of the domestic and
international spheres” can allow a dispute to escape local institutions). For a
clarification of this argument, see Sergio Puig, Investor-State Tribunals and
Constitutional Courts: The Mexican Sweeteners Saga, 5 MEX. L. REV. 199, 202 (2013),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2042798 (“[S]upranational adjudicatory
bodies may affect domestic politics by empowering and expanding remedies
available to foreign investors.”)
67 Martins Paparinskis, Investment Arbitration and the Law of Countermeasures,
79 BRIT. YEARBOOK INT’L L. 264, 297–301, 304–305 (2008).
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investors, is adopted by Professor Lowenfeld in a separate opinion
in the case referred to above: Corn Products v. Mexico. He takes
issue with the majority opinion’s characterization of investors’
rights as being similar to third-party rights, and stresses the depoliticization role of the remedy in the following passage:
[T]he essential feature of investor-[s]tate arbitration, as it
has developed since the ICSID Convention . . . is that
controversies between foreign investors and host states are
insulated from political and diplomatic relations between
states. In return for agreeing to independent international
arbitration, the host state is assured that the state of the
investor’s nationality (as defined) will not espouse the
investor’s claim or otherwise intervene in the controversy
between an investor and a host state, for instance by
denying foreign assistance or attempting to pressure the
host state into some kind of settlement. Correspondingly,
the state of the investor’s nationality is relieved of the
pressure of having its relations with the host state disturbed
or distorted by a controversy between its national and the
host state. . . . The paradigm in investor-States disputes, . . .
is a dispute between the first party (nearly always the
investor) as plaintiff, and the second party (nearly always
the host state or state agency) as respondent. There is no
third party.68
Moreover, a different tribunal in Cargill v. Mexico (Pryles,
Caron, and McRae) analyzing the exact same issue also stressed the
corrective function of the remedy. After examining the arguments
posed by the respondent, it concluded:
[I]t is the investor that is named in the operating paragraph
or ‘dispositive’ of the award. . . . [the granting of rights
under the investment treaty] is no different from rights of
individuals within many municipal legal systems. That the
origin of individual rights may be found in the act of a
sovereign, or in the joint act of sovereigns, does not negate
the existence of the rights conferred. . . . [I]t is the investor
that acts upon and benefits from the obligations . . . it is the
68 Corn Products. Int’l, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/04/01 (NAFTA), Separate Opinion of Andreas F. Lowenfeld , ¶ 1 – 4
(Jan. 15, 2008), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1012_En&caseId=C29.
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investor that institutes the claim, that calls a tribunals into
existence, and that is the named party in all respects to the
resulting proceedings and award.69
4.4. Delegated Rights: Risk Assessment and Conflict Prevention
The final archetypal function of investor-state arbitration as a
remedy of international investment law is to serve as a source of
certainty and to incentivize flows of FDI.70 This is anchored in the
belief that “the prospect of involvement in . . . [investor-state
arbitration] proceedings will work as a deterrent to the actions
which give rise to the institution of proceedings”.71
The embedded idea in this conceptualization—investors as
rational decision makers—has been most recently challenged by
the findings of behavioral economists and social psychologists,
which show that human decisions are not purely rational.72
Instead, they are susceptible to systematic biases and errors, and
they are greatly affected by internal processes that do not
correspond to a cost-benefit analysis.73 Similarly, scholars have
long argued that law-related considerations often play a
surprisingly minor role in the organization and implementation of
business affairs and in decisions to invest.74 Again, I leave this

69 Cargill, Inc. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2,
Award, ¶ 425–26 (Sep. 18, 2009), available at http://www.italaw.com/.
70 See ICSID Convention, supra note 11, ¶ 10. See also Vandevelde, supra note
19, at 258 (describing “binding third-party arbitration of investment disputes” as a
mechanism to promote fluxes of FDI).
71 Shihata, supra note 48, at 9 (emphasis added).
72 See generally Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, D. Alex Hughes & David. G. Victor,
The Behavioral Psychology of Elite Decision Making: Implications for Political Science,
UCSD Sch. Int’l Relations & Pacific Stud., Oct. 28, 2011, at 1, available at
polisci2.ucsd.edu/dhughes/research/Elites.pdf.
73 Id.
74 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary
Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 62 (1963) (“[W]hile detailed planning and legal
sanctions play a significant role in some exchanges between businesses, in many
business exchanges their role is small.”). See also Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical
View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467 (1985) (“Contract planning and contract
law, at best, stand at the margin of important long-term continuing business
relations. Business people often do not plan, exhibit great care in drafting
contracts, pay much attention to those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a
legal approach to business relationships.”).
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debate for another time and here only refer to other important
works in the area.75
The interpretation of the function of the remedy as primarily an
element of deterrence emphasizes its utility for business planning
and ex ante conflict prevention. It stresses that by agreeing to grant
a remedy states may be less likely to commit acts, which would
give rise to conflict. If so, there is a credibly “enforceable”
commitment. The remedy is precisely that enforcement side that
acts as an (distant) element of inhibition. The potential relief is
monetary damages that serve to alleviate (some) concerns over the
effective application of a ‘rule of law,’ especially in countries with
difficult institutional environments (courts or otherwise).
Under this conceptualization of the remedy, the right to invoke
responsibility against the state is akin to a delegated right. This
right is assigned from the original right holders (the sovereigns) to
an entire universe of economic participants, as defined by the
international investment instrument.
The international
agreements, while celebrated between states, establish a
mechanism through which the parties can give up the international
right to espouse the claims of a national before an international
forum. The delegation serves to protect—first and foremost—the
investor by reducing the additional cost of higher risks (as reflected
in the risk premium on new investments). It creates more certainty
in the investor’s decision process by limiting potential arbitrariness
in the exercise of diplomatic protection, in the application of
reprisals against a state found in violation and in the allocation of
the (eventual) retaliation benefits to compensate the investor for its
losses. Under the view of the “delegated diplomatic protection”
the host state owes primary obligations only to the home state, and
the investor only invokes responsibility for their breach. The right
to invoke responsibility is the only carve-out from a “robust” and
optimal regime of general international law.76 Such a regime is
efficient since it ensures the proportionality of measures taken

75
See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael
Waibel et al. eds., 2010) (trying to identify and address some of the systemic
concerns, such as limitations on domestic policy space, a lack of democratic
accountability, a systemic pro-investor bias, and the inability of treaties to
respond to changes in economic circumstances).
76 For this position, see Francisco González de Cossío, Investment Protection
Rights: Substantive or Procedural?, 26 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 107 (2011).
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when a state breaches an international obligation.77 Efficiency, of
course, is a variable in risk assessment.
The majority of the tribunal in the consolidated claims of ADM
and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v. Mexico (Cremades and
Siqueiros) also analyzed whether countermeasures could be
successfully opposed to the investors. The Tribunal adopted a
similar view of the remedy as the one describe above:
The procedural obligation under . . . [the investment
chapter of the treaty] to submit the dispute to arbitration—
which may arise from the breach of the primary obligations
of the host State addressed in Section A—is owed directly
to the beneficiary of the obligation, in this case the
investors, who have opted in the present case, as a
secondary right holder, to commence international
arbitration proceedings under Chapter Eleven. The power
to bring international arbitral proceedings under Section B,
makes the investor the holder of a procedural right,
irrespective of whether this right may be suspended by the
NAFTA Parties . . . . [It] establishes rights regarding the
treatment of investors, but these rights are not owed by the
host State to the investors, but to the investors’ home State.
Therefore, the rights provided by Section A only exist at the
international plane between NAFTA Parties. Investors are
the objects or mere beneficiaries of those rights.
Accordingly, under Chapter Eleven, the Member States
have an obligation to treat investors of the other NAFTA
Parties under the standards addressed in Section A, but this
obligation is only owed to the state of the investor’s
nationality . . . It therefore follows that the only individual
rights investors enjoy under Chapter Eleven is the
procedural right under Section B to invoke responsibility of
the host State.78
In Arthur Rovine’s concurring opinion in the same case (ADM
et al. v. Mexico), his skepticism of the position of his co-arbitrators
reflects the pragmatism often associated with practitioners of the
77 See Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946, Decision
of Dec. 9, 1978, 18 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 417, 445 (“Counter-measures . . . should
be a wager on the wisdom, not on the weakness of the other Party.”).
78 Archer Daniels Midland Co. et al. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID AF
Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Award, ¶¶ 177–79 (Nov. 21, 2007).
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field. He raised an important point engaging with it, in my modest
view, very superficially: “[W]hat difference does it make whether
an investor’s right to redress for a wrong committed is . . . direct or
derivative?”79 As it turns out, this question “is crucial in certain
cases” such as consent to the commission of a wrongful act,
waivers of obligations, or the application of countermeasures—the
latter a fundamental issue in such dispute.80 However, Rovine also
makes an emblematic point: “[a] right to a remedy is a substantive
right. Legal redress for the wrong committed is a substantive
right.”81
This is perhaps the main point behind this article. While the
problematic character of the “public-private” distinction has long
been recognized by international legal theorists, the field pays little
attention to the methodological limitations of the “proceduralsubstantive” analysis.
As Paparinskis argues, the different
conceptualization of the right to directly invoke responsibility
against a state does not relieve the tribunal of “a diligent
application of traditional techniques of legal reasoning.”82 These
traditional techniques and the rules of state responsibility say very
little about this substantive/procedural dichotomy. The nature of
investors’ rights is left to the particular primary rules.83 Attributing
particular content to this primary rule, i.e., the right to directly
invoke responsibility, is precisely what arbitrators do when
interpreting the “procedural” dimension of international
investment law. In this sense, it is understandable why different
arbitrators may ascribe different meaning to it based on the
different functional reasons used historically to promote investorstate arbitration. Indeed, a careful analysis of the transformation of
ICSID demonstrates how the argument justifying investor-state
arbitration has changed and adopted different narratives,
emphasizing at times its role to grant access to justice and de-

79 Archer Daniels Midland Co. et al. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID AF
Case No. ARB(AF)/04/5, Concurring Opinion of Arthur W. Rovine, ¶ 43 (Nov.
21, 2007) [hereinafter Concurring Opinion of Arthur W. Rovine].
80 Paparinskis, supra note 2, at 646.
81 Concurring Opinion of Arthur W. Rovine, supra note 79, at ¶ 47.
82 Paparinskis, supra note 2, at 646.
83 See James Crawford, ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts: A Retrospect, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 874, 886–88 (2002)
(discussing the articles in light of the bilateral state-to-state political climate that
dominated at the time of their conception).
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politicization or, more recently, its potential role in national
economic development.
The three-level theory presented here could be applicable and
helpful to understanding other areas where tribunals show
disagreement on fundamental aspects of the procedural dimension
of international investment law, such as the type of noncompensatory relief (e.g., injunctions, cessation, punitive damages)
obtainable in investor-state arbitration.84 Of course, such questions
may, in principle be determined by the investment instrument.
Assuming a lack of interpretative guidance, one could understand
why arbitrators contemplating deterrence as an important role of
investor-state arbitration would be more willing to accept punitive
damages (to raise the ‘cost’ of opportunistic behavior on the hands
of states), or arbitrators concerned with procedural justice would
more readily grant injunctions (to avoid the difficulties faced by
foreigners before domestic courts), or why arbitrators concerned
with corrective justice would accept to order cessations (to limit the
effects of a wrong at the hands of authorities). This is just another
example of the ways in which the different functions of the remedy
i.e., procedural justice, corrective justice, or deterrence speak to
investment rights.
5.

CONCLUSION

Justice Holmes once observed that “[l]egal obligations that exist
but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law but that
are elusive to the grasp.”85 Without investor-state arbitration,
investment law obligations would be more elusive and hence the
unique role of this remedy in the future of foreign investment
protection.
Understanding the foundations of the main
enforcement mechanism of international investment law is not
84 See Jarrod Wong, The Misapprehension of Moral Damages in Investor-State
Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2012 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 2013) (stating that
reparation takes one of three forms: Restitution, compensation, or satisfaction.
Restitution focuses on reversing material injuries where possible; compensation
remedies financially assessable injuries, whether material or moral, that are not
made good by restitution; and satisfaction remedies non-financially assessable,
often symbolic, injuries that represent affronts to the state). See also Symposium,
Remedies and Damages in Investment Arbitration, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE (2013),
available at http://www.harvardilj.org/2013/03/hilj-symposium-2/ (featuring
Ankita Ritwik, who gave a brief overview of remedies available in public
international law).
85 Ex parte The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
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only academically relevant, it has practical implications for
arbitrators deciding concrete disputes, or lawyers advocating
positions on behalf of their clients. The subtle differences between
the conceptualization of investor-state as an enforcement system
i.e., procedural justice, corrective justice, or deterrence, may reach
deeply as illustrated by the debate over the application of valid
countermeasures under international law.
Of course, these
representations are to some degree caricatures, but they capture
basic intuitions that may animate the arbitrators’ reasoning. These
differences may also evidence some of the limitations of the
substance-procedure dichotomy. As illustrated by this work, the
construction of substantive law entails assumptions about the
procedures that will apply when that substantive law is ultimately
enforced.86

86 See generally Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law,
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801 (2009).
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